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Abstract
A social choice correspondence is self-implementable in strong equilibrium
if it is implementable in strong equilibrium by a social choice function
selecting from the correspondence itself as a game form. We characterize
all social choice correspondences implementable this way by an anonymous
social choice function satisfying no veto power, given that the number of
agents is large relative to the number of alternatives. It turns out that
these are exactly the social choice correspondences resulting from feasible
elimination procedures as introduced in Peleg (1978).
Keywords Implementation, strong equilibrium, social choice correspondence
JEL Classification C70, D71
1 Introduction
A social choice correspondence chooses alternatives based on the preferences of
the agents. Generally speaking one looks for social choice correspondences with
desirable properties, such as anonymity, Pareto optimality, and many more. The
problem, as already studied in Hurwicz (1972), is that preferences may be pri-
vate knowledge or, more generally, agents are entitled to report any preferences
they wish, resulting in alternatives chosen on the basis of the wrong informa-
tion, and thus in the desired properties of the social choice correspondence being
violated. Requiring strategy-proofness of a social choice function, meaning that
no agent can ever benefit from not reporting truthfully, is in general too strong
and results in dictatorship (Gibbard, 1973, Satterthwaite, 1975).
Implementation theory is concerned with finding game forms (mechanisms,
decentralized systems) of which the equilibrium (Nash, strong, etc.) alternatives
in the game with the true preferences coincide with the alternatives assigned
to those preferences by the social choice correspondence under consideration.
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In particular since the work of Hurwicz (1972) there is a large literature on
necessary and/or sufficient conditions for implementation of social choice cor-
respondences under various equilibrium concepts, with Maskin (1999) as one
of the basic contributions. For an overview of this literature up to the current
millennium see Jackson (2001).
A well-recognized drawback of many of the game forms or mechanisms em-
ployed in implementation theory is that they tend to be fairly complicated and
not easy to use in practice. For instance, they may require agents to report not
just preferences but complete preference profiles, to report integer numbers, etc.
In the present paper, we therefore ask what is still feasible by using what we
call ‘self-implementation’: this means implementation by a game form that is
simply a selection (social choice function) from the correspondence under con-
sideration and, thus, requires the agents just to report their own preferences
and nothing else. Apart from the simplicity of such a mechanism its use is also
defendable in the sense that it is close to the social choice correspondence that
is deemed desirable. Specifically, we ask the following question: which social
choice correspondences are self-implementable in strong equilibrium (that is,
strategy-profiles such that no coalition can gain by deviating, as introduced in
Aumann, 1959)?
It turns out that under some natural additional conditions we are able to give
a precise answer to this question: if the number of agents is not too small and
the social choice function that selects from the correspondence and implements
it is anonymous and satisfies ‘no veto power’ then the correspondence must
result from a so-called feasible elimination procedure, as already introduced in
Peleg (1978). The number of agents being not too small will be made precise
and, together with the no veto power property boils down to this number being
at least twice as large as the number of alternatives – a condition satisfied in
most (political) elections. No veto power means that no agent on its own is
able to exclude any alternative from being chosen – again a natural condition
in larger elections. This result is quite involved and to some extent based on
a selection from existing results in the literature; nevertheless, we present a
completely self-contained proof.
The approach in Peleg (1978) and subsequent work (see Peleg and Peters,
2010) is different from implementation theory. Given a social choice corre-
spondence one looks for a game form that exactly represents it, meaning that
coalitions can achieve in the game form exactly what they can achieve in the
social choice correspondence. Thus, this requirement is much stronger than in
implementation theory. On the other hand, it is only required that for every
(true) preference profile there exists at least one (Nash, strong, ...) equilib-
rium, and this is a much weaker condition than in implementation theory. One
could say that the main result of this paper reveals a case where the approaches
overlap.
Section 2 introduces the main concepts and Section 3 presents the main
result. Most parts of the proof are shifted to the Appendix. Section 4 concludes.
Notations The following basic notations are used throughout. For a set D, |D|
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denotes the cardinality of D, P (D) the power set, i.e., the set of all subsets of
D, and P0(D) the set of all nonempty subsets of D.
2 Self-implementation in strong equilibrium
Let A be the set of m alternatives, m ≥ 2, and let N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2, be
the set of voters. Subsets of N are called coalitions. Let L be the set of all
preferences, i.e., complete, antisymmetric and transitive binary relations, on A.
Then LN is the set of all (preference) profiles. A social choice correspondence
(SCC) is a function H : LN → P0(A). A social choice function (SCF) is a
function F : LN → A. A social choice function F is a selection from a social
choice correspondence H if F (RN ) ∈ H(RN ) for every RN ∈ LN .
A game form is an (n+1)-tuple g = (Σ1, . . . ,Σn, pi), where Σi is the strategy
set of player (voter) i ∈ N , and pi : Πni=1Σi → A is the outcome function.
For every RN ∈ LN the pair (g,RN ) is a(n ordinal) game. A strategy profile
σ ∈ Πni=1Σi is a strong equilibrium (Aumann, 1959) in the game (g,RN ) if
there are no S ∈ P0(N) and σ˜S ∈ Πi∈SΣi such that pi(σ˜S , σN\S) 6= pi(σ) and
pi(σ˜S , σN\S)Ripi(σ) for all i ∈ S.1
A social choice correspondenceH is strong equilibrium implementable if there
is a game form g = (Σ1, . . . ,Σn, pi) such that for every RN ∈ LN we have
H(RN ) = {pi(σ) : σ is a strong equilibrium in (g,RN )} .
In this case we also say that the game form g implements the SCC H in strong
equilibrium.
A social choice function F can be identified with the game form in which
the strategy set of each voter is the set L and the outcome function is F , i.e.,
to each strategy profile (preference profile) QN ∈ LN the outcome (alternative)
F (QN ) is assigned. We denote this game form simply by F . Then (F,RN ) is a
game for every RN ∈ LN .
LetH be a social choice correspondence. We callH strong self-implementable
if there is a social choice function F such that
(i) F (RN ) ∈ H(RN ) for every RN ∈ LN , and
(ii) H(RN ) = {F (QN ) : QN is a strong equilibrium in (F,RN )}.
In words, the selection F from H implements H in strong equilibrium.
We assume that every SCC H (including every SCF, since this can be viewed
as a single-valued SCC) occurring in the rest of the paper is non-imposed, i.e.,
for every x ∈ A there is an RN ∈ LN such that H(RN ) = {x}.
A well-known necessary condition (Maskin, 1999; see also Jackson, 2001) for
H to be (self-)implementable is the following.
Maskin monotonicity For all RN = (R1, . . . , Rn), QN = (Q1, . . . , Qn) ∈ LN ,
and x ∈ H(QN ), if xQiy implies xRiy for all y ∈ A and i ∈ N , then x ∈ H(RN ).
1Here, σN\S denotes the restriction of σ to N \S. Similar notation will be used throughout
the paper.
3
3 Main result
The main purpose of this section is to characterize all social choice correspon-
dences H that are self-implementable in strong equilibrium if the number of
voters is relatively large and the selection that implements H satisfies two nat-
ural properties, namely anonymity and no-veto power. The latter means that
no voter on his own should be able to exclude any alternative from being cho-
sen. We arrive at this theorem by combining a number of existing results in the
literature, but our proof will be self-contained.
We start with the following concept, introduced by Peleg (1978). A social
choice function F is exactly and strongly consistent (ESC) if for every RN ∈ LN
the game (F,RN ) has a strong equilibrium QN ∈ LN such that F (QN ) =
F (RN ). We now immediately have the following result.
Lemma 3.1. Let the selection F from the social choice correspondence H im-
plement H in strong equilibrium. Then F is ESS.
Proof. Let RN ∈ LN and x = F (RN ). Then x ∈ H(RN ) and therefore there
is a strong equilibrium QN of the game (F,RN ) such that F (QN ) = x. Hence,
F (QN ) = F (RN ). ¤
The SCCs of interest in this section are based on so-called feasible elimination
procedures. Informally, first, assign weights β(x) ∈ N to the alternatives x ∈ A.
Consider a preference profile and take an alternative x that is bottom ranked at
least β(x) times. Delete that alternative from the profile and at the same time
delete β(x) preferences where x is bottom ranked. Repeat this procedure until
one alternative remains, which happens under appropriate conditions.
Formally, we have the following definition. A function β : A → N such
that
∑
x∈A β(x) = n+ 1 will be called a weight function. Notice that if such a
function exists then we must have n+ 1 ≥ m.
Definition 3.2. Let β be a weight function. Let RN ∈ LN . A feasible elimina-
tion procedure (f.e.p.) for RN is a sequence (x1, C1; . . . ;xm−1, Cm−1;xm) such
that
(a) A = {x1, . . . , xm},
(b) C1, . . . , Cm−1 are pairwise disjoint subsets of N and |Cj | = β(xj) for all
j = 1, . . . ,m− 1,
(c) xkRixj for all j = 1, . . . ,m− 1, k = j + 1, . . . ,m, and i ∈ Cj .
Thus, in a feasible elimination procedure (x1, C1; . . . ;xm−1, Cm−1;xm), by
condition (c) alternative x1 is bottom ranked for all voters in C1 and by condition
(b), |C1| = β(x1). Now x1 is deleted from RN and also the preferences of the
voters in C1 are deleted. In the remaining profile, x2 is bottom ranked for all
voters in C2 by condition (c), and by condition (b), |C2| = β(x2), so that x2
can be deleted and also the preferences of the voters in C2. And so on and
so forth. Observe that after deleting x1 there are n − β(x1) voters left, after
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deleting x2 there are n−β(x1)−β(x2) voters left, and after deleting xm−1 there
are n− β(x1)− . . .− β(xm−1) = β(xm)− 1 ≥ 0 voters left.
An important observation about f.e.p.’s is the following. Suppose an alter-
native x is bottom ranked by (at least) the voters in some coalition S with
|S| = β(x), in a profile RN ∈ LN . Then x must be eliminated in every f.e.p. for
RN . To see this suppose there is an f.e.p. in which x is not eliminated and let
y be the alternative eliminated last, say via coalition T . Then the finally left
voters form a coalition S′ containing S. We have β(y) + β(x) = |T | + |S′| + 1
by the foregoing, but also |T |+ |S′| ≥ β(y) + β(x), a contradiction.
It is not difficult to see that there exists always at least one f.e.p. under the
assumptions in the definition. If every alternative xj is bottom ranked less than
β(xj) times, then the total number of voters is at most
∑m
j=1 β(xj)−m, which
is equal to n+1−m and therefore strictly smaller than n. A similar argument
can be made after elimination of each alternative x1, . . . , xm−2.
Let β be a weight function. An alternative x is RN -maximal if there exists
an f.e.p. (x1, C1; . . . ;xm−1, Cm−1;x). We denote
Mβ(RN ) = {x ∈ A : x is RN -maximal}.
Thus, Mβ depends on the exogenously chosen weights β(x) ∈ N, x ∈ A, which
can be varied as long as
∑
x∈A β(x) = n+ 1.
The following lemma repeats the known result thatMβ is Maskin monotonic.
For completeness, a proof can be found in the appendix. For a weight function
β as in Definition 3.2 we use the notation β(B) =
∑
x∈B β(x) for B ⊆ A.
Lemma 3.3. Let β be a weight function. Then Mβ is Maskin monotonic.
Next, we provide a characterization of maximal alternatives.
Lemma 3.4. Let β be a weight function. Let x ∈ A and RN ∈ LN . The
following statements are equivalent.
(i) x ∈Mβ(RN ).
(ii) There are no S ∈ P0(N) and B ∈ P0(A) such that |S| ≥ β(A \ B),
x ∈ A \B, and y Ri x for all i ∈ S and y ∈ B.
The following result says thatMβ is self-implementable in strong equilibrium
by any selection from it.
Proposition 3.5. Let β be a weight function and let F be a selection from Mβ.
Then F implements Mβ in strong equilibrium.
Proof. (a) Let RN ∈ LN and x ∈Mβ(RN ). We show that there is a strong equi-
librium QN of (F,RN ) such that F (QN ) = x. Let (x1, C1; . . . ;xm−1, Cm−1;x)
be an f.e.p. for RN and consider the profile QN ∈ LN obtained from RN
by lowering xj to the last position in the preferences of the voters in Cj ,
j = 1, . . . ,m − 1, leaving everything else in tact. Then Mβ(QN ) = {x},
hence F (QN ) = x. Also, QN is a strong equilibrium of (F,RN ). Indeed as-
sume on the contrary that there exist S ∈ P0(N) and PS ∈ LS such that
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F (PS , QN\S) = z 6= x and zRix for all i ∈ S. Then z = xj for some
1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1. By the definition of an f.e.p., xRiz for all i ∈ Cj , hence
S ∩ Cj = ∅. Since |Cj | = β(z) and z is the last ranked alternative of Q` for all
` ∈ Cj , we have that z /∈Mβ(PS , QN\S), contradicting F (PS , QN\S) = z.
(b) Let QN be strong equilibrium of (F,RN ) with F (QN ) = x. We show
that x ∈ Mβ(RN ). It is sufficient to show that (ii) of Lemma 3.4 holds for
x. Suppose not. Then there is an S ∈ P0(N) and B ∈ P0(A), x /∈ B, such
that yRix for all y ∈ B and i ∈ S, and |S| ≥ β(A \ B). Consider a profile
PS ∈ LS with A \ B at bottom for all voters in S. Then by the remarks
following Definition 3.2, all elements of A \ B will be eliminated in any f.e.p.
for (PS , QN\S), so that Mβ(PS , QN\S) ⊆ B, hence S has an improvement, a
contradiction to the assumption that QN is strong equilibrium of (F,RN ). ¤
Before turning to a converse of Proposition 3.5 we introduce two additional
possible properties of a social choice correspondence H. Of course, these prop-
erties also apply for a social choice function F , since a social choice function
can be identified with a single-valued social choice correspondence.
Anonymity For all RN ∈ LN and for all permutations pi of N , H(R1, . . . ,
Rn) = H(Rpi(1), . . . , Rpi(n)).
No Veto Power For all x ∈ A and i ∈ N , there is no Ri ∈ L such that
x /∈ H(Ri, RN\{i}) for all RN\{i} ∈ LN\{i}.
Proposition 3.6. Let social choice function F be ESC, anonymous, and satisfy
No Veto Power, and let n+1 ≥ m. Then there is a weight function β such that
F is a selection from Mβ.
This proposition follows from earlier results in the literature, but for com-
pleteness we provide a self-contained proof in the appendix. The following
theorem is a corollary to Propositions 3.5 and 3.6 and the main result of this
section.
Theorem 3.7. Let n + 1 ≥ m and let the social choice function H be imple-
mentable in strong equilibrium by a selection F which is anonymous and satisfies
No Veto Power. Then H =Mβ for some weight function β.
Proof. By Lemma 3.1 and Proposition 3.6 it follows that there is a weight
function β such that F (RN ) ∈ Mβ(RN ) for all RN ∈ LN . By Proposition 3.5,
F implements Mβ in strong equilibrium. Hence,
H(RN ) = {F (QN ) : QN is a strong equilibrium in (F,RN )} =Mβ(RN )
for all RN ∈ LN , which completes the proof. ¤
Theorem 3.7 says, roughly, that if the number of voters is relatively large,
then the only social choice correspondences which are self-implementable in a
reasonable way in strong equilibrium are the correspondences Mβ . Typically,
in political elections the constraint n+ 1 ≥ m is satisfied and the conditions of
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Anonymity and No Veto Power for a final selection of a candidate are natural
if not compelling.
The conditions of Anonymity and No Veto Power in the theorem are on the
selection F . It is not difficult to see that F can be anonymous but H not, or
the other way around. If F satisfies No Veto Power then also H does, but the
converse is not necessarily true. Since, thus, Mβ in the theorem satisfies No
Veto Power, it follows by the definition of an f.e.p. that β(x) ≥ 2 for all x ∈ A.
4 Concluding remarks
Clearly, the approach in this paper leaves many open questions. We mention
two of these. First, which social choice correspondences are self-implementable
in strong equilibrium if the number of agents is relatively small – for instance,
a small group of people in a restaurant has to make some common choices from
a large menu of dishes? Second, what can be said about self-implementation in
Nash equilibrium?
A Remaining proofs
A.1 Proofs of Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4
Proof of Lemma 3.3.2 Let QN and RN be as in the definition of Maskin mono-
tonicity, and x ∈ Mβ(QN ). Without loss of generality we assume that there is
a voter v such that QN\{v} = RN\{v}. Let f∗ = (x1, C1; . . . ;xm−1, Cm−1;x) be
an f.e.p. for QN , where A = {x1, . . . , xm−1, x}. If v /∈ C1 ∪ . . .∪Cm−1 then it is
easy to see that f∗ is still an f.e.p. for RN , so that x ∈ Mβ(RN ). Now assume
v ∈ C1 ∪ . . . ∪ Cm−1. If v ∈ Cj with j > 1, then we may eliminate x1, . . . , xj−1
and all voters in C1 ∪ . . .∪Cj−1 first, and next continue the argument with the
remaining profile, where now all voters in Cj have xj bottom ranked according
to QCj . So, without loss of generality, let v ∈ C1.
The rest of the proof is based on a three step algorithm.
Step 1 If the bottom alternative of Rv is equal to x1, then f∗ is still an f.e.p.
for RN and we are done. Otherwise, go to Step 2.
Step 2 Let the bottom alternative of Rv be x` 6= x1, so ` ∈ {2, . . . ,m−1}. If
all voters in C` have x` as bottom alternative in RN , then we can first eliminate
x` via C` and go back to Step 1 for the reduced profile. Otherwise, go to Step 3.
Step 3 Take vˆ ∈ C` with x` not as bottom alternative and note that the bot-
tom alternative of Rvˆ = Qvˆ is some xj with j < ` (since xj must be eliminated
before x` in f∗). Then modify C` to Cˆ` = (C` ∪ {v}) \ {vˆ} and modify C1 to
Cˆ1 = (C1 ∪ {vˆ}) \ {v}. (In words, we switch v and vˆ.) Go back to Step 1.
2See Lemma 5.3.5 in Peleg (1984); or Remark 9.3.7 in Peleg and Peters (2010), based on
Theorem 9.3.6 in the same source. In turn, the latter result goes back to Polishchuk (1978).
More generally, Lemma 3.7 in Peleg and Peters (2017b) shows Maskin monotonicity of an
extension of Mβ .
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Repeat this procedure until the final substitute of v in the modified C1 has x1
at bottom. Then we can apply an f.e.p. resulting in x, so that x ∈Mβ(RN ). ¤
Proof of Lemma 3.4.3 For the implication (i) ⇒ (ii), let x ∈ Mβ(RN ) and let
(x1, C1; . . . ; xm−1, Cm−1;x) be an f.e.p. for RN . Suppose there were S and B as
in (ii). Write B = {xi1 , . . . , xi|B|} ⊆ {x1, . . . , xm−1}, then
(
∪|B|j=1Cij
)
∩ S = ∅
by definition of an f.e.p., and | ∪|B|j=1 Cij | = β(B). Hence |S| + | ∪|B|j=1 Cij | ≥
β(A \B) + β(B) = n+ 1, a contradiction.
We prove the implication (ii)⇒ (i) by induction on the number of alterna-
tives m. Let x ∈ A and assume that (ii) holds.
If m = 2, say A = {x, y}, then there is no S ∈ P0(N) such that |S| ≥ β(x)
and yRix for all i ∈ S, so that Mβ(RN ) = {x}.
Now suppose that m > 2 and that the implication (ii) ⇒ (i) holds if there
are less than m alternatives. For every B ∈ P0(A \ {x}) denote SB = {i ∈ N :
yRix for all y ∈ B}. Then (ii) is equivalent to
|SB | < β(A \B) for all B ∈ P0(A \ {x}) (1)
hence to
|N \ SB | ≥ β(B) for all B ∈ P0(A \ {x}). (2)
We consider two cases.
Case 1 There exists B˜ ∈ P0(A \ {x}) with |B˜| ≤ m− 2 and |N \ SB˜ | = β(B˜).
For this case we consider the two following subproblems:
• N1 = N \ SB˜ , A1 = B˜ ∪ {x}, β1(y) = β(y) for all y ∈ B˜, β1(x) = 1, and
Ri1 = R
i
|A1 for all i ∈ N1.4
• N2 = SB˜ , A2 = A \ B˜, β2(y) = β(y) for all y ∈ A2, and Ri2 = Ri|A2 for all
i ∈ N2.
We next show that (1) holds for the first subproblem. If not, then there is a
B ∈ P0(B˜) such that |T | ≥ β1(A1\B), where T = {i ∈ N1 : yRi1x for all y ∈ B}.
Then |T ∪ SB˜ | = |T |+ |SB˜ | ≥ [β1(x) + β(B˜)− β(B)] + [n− β(B˜)] = β(A \B),
hence |SB | ≥ β(A \ B), which is a violation of (1) for the original problem.
Therefore, (1) must hold for the first subproblem, implying that x ∈Mβ1(RN11 )
by induction.
Similarly, suppose that (1) does not hold for the second subproblem. Then
there is a B ∈ P0(A \ (B˜ ∪ {x})) such that |T | ≥ β2(A2 \ B), where now
T = {i ∈ SB˜ : yRi2x for all y ∈ B}. Then |T ∪ (N \ SB˜)| = |T | + |N \ SB˜ | ≥
[β(A) − β(B) − β(B˜)] + β(B˜) = β(A \ B), which is a violation of (1) for the
original problem. We conclude that (1) must hold for the second subproblem
as well, so that x ∈Mβ2(RN22 ) by induction.
3Also this result can be deduced from Theorem 9.3.6 in Peleg and Peters (2010). It is
included as Lemma 3.5 in Peleg and Peters (2017a).
4Ri|B denotes the restriction of R
i to B.
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Now let (z1, C1; . . . ; z|B˜|, C|B˜|;x) be an f.e.p. for the first subproblem and
let (u1, D1; . . . ;um−1−|B˜|, Dm−1−|B˜|;x) be an f.e.p. for the second subproblem.
Since, in particular, yRix for all y ∈ B˜ and i ∈ N2 = SB˜ , it follows that
(u1, D1; . . . ;um−1−|B˜|, Dm−1−|B˜|; z1, C1; . . . ; z|B˜|, C|B˜|;x)
is an f.e.p. for the original problem, implying that in this case we have x ∈
Mβ(RN ).
Case 2 For all B˜ ∈ P0(A \ {x}) with |B˜| ≤ m− 2 we have |N \ SB˜ | > β(B˜).
Suppose there is an ` ∈ N such that x is not ranked at the last or second last
position in R`, and let ŷ be the alternative ranked right below x. We switch x
and ŷ in voter `’s preference to obtain a new preference R̂` and a new preference
profile R̂N = (R1, . . . , R`−1, R̂`, R`+1, . . . , RN ) that still satisfies (2): for any set
B with |B| ≤ m − 2 this holds because of the strict inequality in Case 2, and
for B = A \ {x} this holds since x is not ranked last in R̂`.
If Case 1 applies to R̂N , then x ∈ Mβ(R̂N ). Thus, by Lemma 3.3, x ∈
Mβ(RN ). If Case 1 does not apply to R̂N , then we repeat this step for some
voter `′ ∈ N with x not ranked last or second last at R̂`′ , and so on, until either
Case 1 applies or there is no voter left with x not ranked at the last or second
last position.
In the latter case, we have a profile, say R˜N , for which still (2) holds and with
x ranked last or second last for each voter i ∈ N . Observe that y is last ranked
for all voters in N \ S{y} for all y ∈ A \ {x}. Also, by (2), |N \ S{y}| ≥ β(y) for
all y ∈ A \ {x}. It follows that in any f.e.p. for R˜N every y ∈ A \ {x} is bottom
ranked by at least β(y) voters and therefore eliminated, so thatMβ(R˜N ) = {x}.
By Lemma 3.3 again, x ∈M(RN ).
By (2), Cases 1 and 2 are exhaustive, which completes the proof of the
lemma. ¤
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.6
We now turn to the proof of Proposition 3.6. It will be convenient to introduce
some terminology related to effectivity functions.5 Let F be a social choice
function and let S ⊆ N and B ⊆ A. Then S is (F -)effective for B is there is
RS ∈ LS such that F (RS , QN\S) ∈ B for all QN\S ∈ LN\S . For every x ∈ A
define the integer b(x) (the ‘blocking coefficient’ of x) by
b(x) = min{|S| : S ⊆ N is effective for A \ {x} } .
By non-imposition of F , we have 1 ≤ b(x) ≤ n for all x ∈ A. We write b(B) for∑
x∈B b(x), B ⊆ A. Of course, b(·) depends on F but this will be suppressed
from notation if confusion is unlikely.
5These functions have been first formally introduced in Moulin and Peleg (1982). Here we
just use some of the associated terminology.
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We start with three useful observations.6
Lemma A.1. Let the SCF F be anonymous. Let S ⊆ N and B ⊆ A such that
|S| ≥ b(A \B). Then S is effective for B.
Proof. Write A \ B = {x1, . . . , xk}, where k ≥ 0. Let S1, . . . , Sk be a partition
of S such that |Sj | ≥ b(xj) for each j = 1, . . . , k, and let RSj ∈ LSj such that
F (RSj , QN\Sj ) ∈ A \ {xj} for each j = 1, . . . , k and QN\Sj ∈ LN\Sj . Then
F (RS , QN\S) ∈ B for all QN\S ∈ LN\S . So S is effective for B. ¤
Lemma A.2. Let the SCF F be ESC and let S ⊆ N be effective for B ⊆ A.
Let RN ∈ LN and x ∈ A \ B such that yRix for all y ∈ B and i ∈ S. Then
F (RN ) 6= x.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that F (RN ) = x and let QN be a strong equilib-
rium in (F,RN ) with F (QN ) = x. Since S is effective for B, there is PS ∈ LS
such that F (PS , QN\S) ∈ B, contradicting that QN is a strong equilibrium in
(F,RN ). ¤
Lemma A.3. Let the SCF F be ESC and anonymous, and assume that b(A) =
n+ 1. Then F is a selection from Mb.
Proof. Let RN ∈ LN and x = F (RN ). Let B ⊆ A, S ⊆ N , |S| ≥ b(A \ B), and
x ∈ A \B. In order to prove that x ∈Mb(RN ), it is by Lemma 3.4 sufficient to
prove that we do not have yRix for all y ∈ B and i ∈ S.
On the contrary, suppose that yRix for all y ∈ B and i ∈ S. Since |S| ≥
b(A\B), Lemma A.1 implies that S is effective for B. Then Lemma A.2 implies
that F (RN ) 6= x, a contradiction. ¤
Notice that in order to obtain Proposition 3.6 we may try and derive the
condition b(A) = n+ 1 in Lemma A.3. This is, essentially, what is done in the
remainder of the proof.
Lemma A.4. Let the SCF F be ESC, S ⊆ N , B ⊆ A, and suppose that for
every QN\S ∈ LN\S there is PS ∈ LS such that F (PS , QN\S) ∈ B. Then S is
effective for B.7
Proof. On the contrary, suppose that for every QS ∈ LS there is PN\S ∈ LN\S
such that F (QS , PN\S) ∈ A \ B. Consider a profile RN ∈ LN such that xRiy
and yRjx for every i ∈ S, j ∈ N \ S, x ∈ B, and y ∈ A \ B. Let z = F (RN )
and let QN be a strong equilibrium of (F,RN ) with F (QN ) = z. If z ∈ A \ B
then S can improve by a profile PS as in the statement of the lemma. If z ∈ B
then N \ S can improve by a profile PN\S as above. ¤
In what follows we will use the notion of a generalized partition or g-partition
of a set, which is a partition in which some elements may be empty.
6Many of the arguments in this part are based on Chapter 10 in Peleg and Peters (2010)
and the references therein.
7This lemma states that the effectivity function associated with F is ‘maximal’. See Moulin
and Peleg (1982) or Peleg (1984).
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Lemma A.5. Let the SCF F be ESC. Then there are no p ≥ 2, partition
B1, . . . , Bp of A and g-partition S1, . . . , Sp of N such that N \Si is effective for
Bi, for every i = 1, . . . , p.
Proof. Suppose not, so (g-)partitions as in the lemma exist. Consider a profile
RN as in the following table:
S1 S2 · · · Sp
B2 B3 · · · B1
...
...
...
Bp B1 · · · Bp−1
B1 B2 · · · Bp
(meaning that every member of coalition S1 prefers all alternatives of B2 over
all alternatives of B3, all alternatives of B3 over all alternatives of B4, and so
on and so forth). Now by Lemma A.2, F (RN ) /∈ Bi for every i = 1, . . . , p. Since
∪pi=1Bi = A, this is a contradiction. ¤
Lemma A.6. Let the SCF F be ESC and satisfy NVP. Then there are no
partition {x}, B1, B2 of A and g-partition S, T1, T2 of N such that |S| = b(x)
and N \ Tj is effective for Bj for j = 1, 2.
Proof. Suppose not, so (g-)partitions as in the lemma exist.
First, suppose S = N . Then for every i ∈ N , |N \ {i}| < |S| = b(x).
Therefore, for every QN\{i} ∈ LN\{i} there is P i ∈ L such that F (P i, QN\{i}) =
x, so that by Lemma A.4, {i} is effective for x. Since |A| ≥ 2 this violates NVP
of F . Thus, S 6= N and b(x) < n. By NVP, also b(x) > 1. So |S| ≥ 2 and
T1 ∪ T2 6= ∅.
Let now S1, S2 be a partition of S and consider a profile RN as in the
following table:
S1 S2 T1 T2
B2 B1 {x} {x}
B1 B2 B2 B1
{x} {x} B1 B2
Since S = S1∪S2 is effective for A\{x} = B1∪B2 we have by Lemma A.2 that
F (RN ) 6= x. Without loss of generality we assume that F (RN ) ∈ B1. Let QN
be a strong equilibrium in (F,RN ) with F (QN ) = F (RN ), hence F (QN ) 6= x.
Case 1: xQiy for some i ∈ S, without loss of generality i ∈ S1, and y ∈ A \ {x}.
In this case consider the partition {x}, {y}, A\{x, y} of A and the g-partition
S \ {i}, {i}, T1 ∪ T2 of N . Since |S \ {i}| < b(x) we have that N \ (S \ {i}) is
effective for {x} by Lemma A.4. By NVP and Lemma A.4, N \ {i} is effective
for {y}. Hence, by Lemma A.5, N \ (T1 ∪ T2) is not effective for A \ {x, y}.
In turn, again by Lemma A.4, this implies that T1 ∪ T2 is effective for {x, y}.
Consider a profile PT1∪T2 ∈ LT1∪T2 such that xP jyP jz for all j ∈ T1 ∪ T2 and
z ∈ A \ {x, y}. Then by Lemma A.2, F (PT1∪T2 , QS) ∈ {x, y}. Since xQiy and
since T1 ∪ T2 ∪ {i} = N \ (S \ {i}) is effective for {x}, again by Lemma A.2,
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F (PT1∪T2 , QS) 6= y. Hence, F (PT1∪T2 , QS) = x. This contradicts that QN is a
strong equilibrium in (F,RN ).
Case 2: yQix for all i ∈ S and y ∈ A \ {x}.
In this case, consider the partition {x}, B1, B2 of A and the g-partition
S2, S1 ∪ T1, T2 of N . Since |S2| < b(x) we have by Lemma A.4 that N \ S2 is
effective for {x}. By assumption, N\T2 is effective for B2. Hence by Lemma A.5,
N \ (S1 ∪ T1) is not effective for B1, which in turn by Lemma A.4 implies
that S1 ∪ T1 is effective for A \ B1. Consider a profile PS1∪T1 ∈ LS1∪T1 such
that yP jxP jz for all j ∈ S1 ∪ T1, y ∈ B2, and z ∈ B1. By Lemma A.2,
F (PS1∪T1 , QS2∪T2) /∈ B1. Since by assumption S1 ∪ S2 ∪ T1 is effective for B2,
by Case 2 yQix for all y ∈ B2 and i ∈ S, and N \T2 is effective for B2, we have
by Lemma A.2 that F (PS1∪T1 , QS2∪T2) 6= x. Hence F (PS1∪T1 , QS2∪T2) ∈ B2.
Since F (QN ) = F (RN ) ∈ B1, S1 ∪ T1 has an improvement, contradicting that
QN is a strong equilibrium of (F,RN ). ¤
Lemma A.7. Let the SCF F be ESC and satisfy NVP, and 1 ≤ k ≤ m −
2. Then there are no partition {x1}, . . . , {xk}, B1, B2 of A and g-partition
S1, . . . , Sk, T1, T2 of N such that |Si| = b(xi) for each i = 1, . . . , k, N \ T1
is effective for B1, and N \ T2 is effective for B2.
Proof. The proof is by induction on k. For k = 1 this is Lemma A.6. Let
2 ≤ k ≤ m − 2 and suppose that the statement in the lemma holds for k −
1. Suppose, on the contrary, that the statement does not hold for k, and let
{x1}, . . . , {xk}, B1, B2 and S1, . . . , Sk, T1, T2 be as in the lemma. Since Si 6= ∅
for every i = 1, . . . , k, we have ∅ 6= Sk ∪T1 6= N . By Lemma A.4, either Sk ∪T1
is effective for A \ ({xk} ∪B1) or N \ (Sk ∪ T1) is effective for {xk} ∪B1. In the
first case, Lemma A.6 is violated for the partition {xk}, B1, A\ ({xk}∪B1) of A
and the g-partition Sk, T1, N \ (Sk ∪T1) of N . In the second case, the induction
hypothesis is violated for the partition {x1}, . . . , {xk−1}, {xk}∪B1, B2 of A and
the g-partition S1, . . . , Sk−1, Sk ∪ T1, T2 of N . ¤
The next lemma says that an ESC social choice function is ‘subadditive’.8
Lemma A.8. Let the SCF F be ESC, let S1 ⊆ N be effective for B1 ⊆ A and
let S2 ⊆ N be effective for B2 ⊆ A, such that B1 ∩ B2 = ∅. Then S1 ∩ S2 is
effective for B1 ∪B2.
Proof. (a) Say that coalition S is s-effective for a set of alternatives B if there
is a partition B1, . . . , Bk of B and there are coalitions S1, . . . , Sk such that Sj
is effective for Bj , j = 1, . . . , k, and S = ∩kj=1Sj . Clearly, if S is effective for B
then S is also s-effective for B by taking k = 1, S1 = S, B1 = B. We will prove
the converse, which will imply the lemma.
(b) We first prove that if S is s-effective for B, then N \ S is not s-effective
for A \ B. Suppose the latter were not the case, i.e., both S is s-effective for
B and N \ S is not s-effective for A \ B. Let B1, . . . , Bk and C1, . . . , C` be
the associated partitions of B and A \ B, and let S1, . . . , Sk and T1, . . . , T`
8Cf. Moulin (1983).
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be the associated coalitions, hence S = ∩kj=1Sj and N \ S = ∩`h=1Th. List
S1, . . . , Sk, T1, . . . , T` as V1, . . . , Vp and list the associated sets of alternatives as
D1, . . . , Dp (where p = k + `). Then for every i ∈ N there is q ∈ {1, . . . , p}
such that i /∈ Vq. Consider a preference profile RN such that for every i ∈ N ,
Dq+1R
iDq+2R
i . . . RiDpR
iD1R
i . . . RiDq. Let x ∈ A. If x ∈ Dq for some q > 1
then Dq−1Rix for all i ∈ Vq−1, so that by Lemma A.2 we have F (RN ) 6= x.
If x ∈ D1 then DpRix for all i ∈ Vp, so that again by Lemma A.2 we have
F (RN ) 6= x. This is not possible, hence we have that if S is s-effective for B,
then N \ S is not s-effective for A \B.
(c) Now, finally, assume that S is s-effective for B. Then by part (b), N \ S
is not s-effective for A \ B, hence by part (a), N \ S is not effective for A \ B.
By Lemma A.4, S is effective for B. This concludes the proof of the lemma. ¤
The final lemma we need is the following.
Lemma A.9. Let the SCF F be ESC and satisfy NVP. Let 0 ≤ k ≤ m − 2.
Then there are no partition {x1}, . . . , {xm} of A and g-partition S1, . . . , Sm of
N such that |Sj | = b(xj) for j = 1, . . . , k and |N \ Sj | is effective for {xj} for
j = k + 1, . . . ,m.
Proof. For k = 0 this follows from Lemma A.5. Now let k > 0. Suppose on the
contrary that we had {x1}, . . . , {xm} and S1, . . . , Sm as in the lemma. By re-
peated application of Lemma A.8 we have that N \(Sk+1∪. . .∪Sm−1) is effective
for {xk+1, . . . , xm−1}. Now the partition {x1}, . . . , {xk}, {xk+1, . . . , xm−1}, {xm}
and g-partition S1, . . . , Sk, T1, T2 with T1 = Sk+1 ∪ . . . ∪ Sm−1 and T2 = Sm vi-
olate Lemma A.7. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3.6. In view of Lemma A.3, it is sufficient to prove that
b(A) = n+ 1. Clearly, b(A) ≥ n+ 1, otherwise N would have some profile RN
such that F (RN ) /∈ A, which is clearly impossible. Write A = {x1, . . . , xm}.
We distinguish two cases.
Case 1 b(A) ≥ n+m. Then n ≤ b(A)−m =∑mj=1(b(xj)− 1), so that there is a
g-partition S1, . . . , Sm of N with |Sj | ≤ b(xj)− 1 for every j = 1, . . . ,m, which
by using Lemma A.4 violates Lemma A.9 for k = 0.
Case 2 b(A) = n + (m − k) for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 2}. In this case, let Sj ,
j = 1, . . . , k, be coalitions with |Sj | = b(xj). Since
k∑
j=1
|Sj | = b(A)− (b(xk+1 + . . .+ b(xm))
= n+ (m− k)− (b(xk+1 + . . .+ b(xm))
≤ n+ (m− k)− (m− k)
= n
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the Sj can be chosen disjoint. Also,
n−
k∑
j=1
|Sj | = n− (b(A)−
m∑
j=k+1
b(xj))
= n− n− (m− k) +
m∑
j=k+1
b(xj))
=
m∑
j=k+1
(b(xj)− 1)
so that we can find disjoint Sk+1, . . . , Sm with |Sj | = b(xj) − 1 for all j =
k + 1, . . . ,m, hence, by Lemma A.4, N \ Sj is effective for {xj}. This is again
a violation of Lemma A.9.
Thus, b(A) = n+ 1, which concludes the proof. ¤
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